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The question this Symposium addresses—“originalism, for or 
against?”—is an odd one.  In some sense, all constitutional interpreters are 
originalists.  We are all offering interpretations of the language of a text, 
making claims about what the text means.  When we offer interpretations, 
we are claiming that our interpretation is in some way consistent with what 
the authors of the text originally wrote.  There is obviously room for dis-
agreement, particularly when the text uses large, vague concepts like “equal 
protection” and “establishment of religion.”  Even the most expansive in-
terpretation of those phrases, however, claims to rely on the same general 
concepts that were laid down by the Framers, who knew what they were do-
ing when they chose to use very abstract language.1  Moreover, as Thomas 
Colby and Peter Smith have shown, originalism now means so many differ-
ent things to so many different writers that it is not a single theory that one 
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Article’s unpleasant strategy, of pretending that “originalist” judges are sincerely trying to discern the 
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  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
1
  Thus, for example, Ronald Dworkin, the bête noire of originalists, thinks that the abstract clauses 
of the Constitution were intended to make interpreters focus on abstract moral concepts.  “The clauses 
are vague only if we take them to be botched or incomplete or schematic attempts to lay down particular 
conceptions.  If we take them as appeals to moral concepts they could not be made more precise by be-
ing more detailed.”  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136 (rev. ed. 1978). 
2
  Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism 1–3 (GWU Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 393, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090282.  The same 
point has been made about the specifics of “originalist” interpretations of the Establishment Clause: dif-
ferent scholars, looking at the same evidence, have reached widely varying conclusions.  See Frank 
Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and the 
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This Article does not attempt to evaluate originalism as such.  Instead, 
it scrutinizes originalism’s specific practice in one doctrinal area, by three 
practitioners who matter: Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices An-
tonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.  This Article shows that their specific 
“originalist” interpretations of the Establishment Clause are remarkably in-
different to the original purposes of that clause.  This is not necessarily a 
criticism of originalism per se.  However, the abuse of originalist scholar-
ship that these judges have practiced raises questions about what originalist 
scholars are actually accomplishing. 
Begin with some familiar puzzles of Establishment Clause interpreta-
tion.  What does the clause have to say about Ten Commandments displays 
in schools or courthouses?  About curricula that include “creation science”?  
About school prayer? 
The proper originalist way to undertake these inquiries would be to 
look at the ideas of the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution to discern 
why establishment of religion was regarded as a bad thing and what princi-
ple condemned it.  The interpreter would then try to figure out how that 
principle applied to the case being decided. 
I would have thought that the preceding paragraph was uncontrover-
sial.3  Remarkably, however, there has been an effort to expel such princi-
pled considerations from the interpretation of the clause.  It has been 
conducted by the self-styled “originalists” on the Supreme Court—Justices 
Scalia and Thomas—and, before them, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist.  
Their arguments are a remarkable congeries of historical error and outright 
misrepresentation.  There is a serious originalist inquiry to be done into the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause, but none of the “originalist” judges 
on the Court appear to have the slightest interest in undertaking that inquiry. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have each fol-
lowed very different strategies in their efforts to unmoor the clause from its 
original purposes.  Their efforts have, however, had two characteristics in 
common: they rest on dreadful historical scholarship, and they conveniently 
coincide with the agenda of the Republican party. 
I. THE VARIETIES OF PHONY ORIGINALISM 
The most remarkable thing about the “originalist” interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause is the consistency of its conclusions.  The historical 
evidence that purports to be the basis for the interpretation is mercurial; it 
changes from one Justice to the next while the bottom line remains the 
same.  This is not surprising.  As others have noted, the “originalist” Jus-
                                                                                                             
Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 382 (1993).  On the other hand, the conclusion offered 
here, that judges find it necessary to distort the evidence in order to reach the results they want, suggests 
that originalism is not in fact infinitely malleable, if its methods are honestly applied. 
3
  Its claims are elaborated in Part II, infra. 
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tices are only opportunistically originalist.4  When original meaning does 
not support the result they want to reach, they tend to ignore it, making it 
difficult to take their professions of originalism seriously.5  Here, though, I 
set that aside and consider their “originalist” interpretations of the Estab-
lishment Clause on the merits.  I begin by noting the political context in 
which they arise.  I then examine their arguments. 
A. Originalism, Orthodoxy, and the Republican Party 
The fundamental claim upon which most of the self-styled “original-
ists” converge is that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit govern-
ment from endorsing religion generally, so long as it does not discriminate 
among religions.  (It later became clear that this meant that government 
could endorse theism, and perhaps more specific theological claims if these 
were shared by the major monotheistic religions.)  The claim was stated 
succinctly by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, in his famous 1985 ABA 
speech calling for “a jurisprudence of original intention.”6  Meese claimed 
that the original intention was solely 
to prohibit Congress from establishing a national church.  The belief was that 
the Constitution should not allow Congress to designate a particular faith or 
sect as politically above the rest.  But to argue, as is popular today, that the 
Amendment demands strict neutrality between religion and irreligion would 
have struck the founding generation as bizarre.  The purpose was to prohibit 





  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, It’s Still the Kennedy Court, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 427, 429–31 (2008) 
(noting the dubious originalist credentials of Scalia’s Second Amendment reasoning); Ira C. Lupu, Em-
ployment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme-Court Centrism, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 260 
(“Justice Scalia, the author of [Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),] claims to be an 
originalist.  Smith shows no signs, however, of any such orientation; the Court’s opinion totally ignores 
both the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause.”  (footnote omitted)); Gene R. Nichol, Justice 
Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953, 969–71 
(1999) (arguing that, in cases involving takings, free exercise, standing, and affirmative action, “Justice 
Scalia departs radically from his chosen theory when it suits his fancy”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost: 
The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 427–28 (1998) (noting that Justice 
Scalia’s “votes to overturn flag burning laws, hate speech laws, and affirmative action programs cannot 
be reconciled with a strictly originalist approach to constitutional interpretation”).  Thanks to Thomas 
Colby for directing me to most of these citations. 
5
  The disingenuousness is particularly striking in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007), in which the majority, including all of the “originalist” jus-
tices, declined even to discuss the massive evidence, presented to them in the briefs, that race-conscious 
means of achieving integration were consciously adopted by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Brief of Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908 & 05-915), 2006 WL 
2922647. 
6
  Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A 
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 52 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
7
  Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 4 
Meese’s position is remarkable, first of all, for its claim that “the 
founding generation” would have rejected as “bizarre” propositions that 
were in fact endorsed by Jefferson and Madison.  Doubtless the two of them 
were more strictly separationist than most of their colleagues, but these 
complexities disappear in Meese’s simple statement. 
Deeper confusions lie in the easy assumption that the denial of state 
support “undermines” religion.  If this is true, then neutrality between Prot-
estantism and Catholicism undermines Protestantism; neutrality between 
Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism undermines Presbyterianism, and so 
forth.  Religion, as Meese imagines it, yearns for the state’s embrace and is 
undermined without it.  The idea that state support corrupts religion—an 
idea embraced, not only by Jefferson and Madison, but by Roger Williams, 
Milton, Locke, Elisha Williams, Backus, Leland, and Adam Smith8—never 
occurs to Meese.9  Meese cites no evidence at all for his claim.  To be fair, 
Meese is not a historian.  He is a politician.10  It is worth pausing to note just 
how politically convenient the claim was. 
Something unusual in American history happened to religion in the 
1970s, just before Meese and the other Reagan men took political power.  
The character of American religious divisions shifted.  The divide between 
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, once so important, had lost its salience.  
New controversies arose over abortion, gay rights, funding for the arts, 
child care policy, the roles of the sexes, and the place of traditional values 
in education, especially in sex education.  The common thread in these de-
bates, James Davison Hunter observes, is the cleavage between orthodox 
and progressive worldviews.  Orthodoxy is characterized by its adherents’ 
commitment to an external, definable, and transcendent authority.  Progres-
sivism, on the other hand, tends to take human well-being as the ultimate 





  See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
9
  It also escapes Justice Kennedy, who has claimed that strict separation of church and state “would 
require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion and so 
to the detriment of the religious.”  County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   This “detriment” is just what the religious 
proponents of disestablishment were hoping for. 
10
  So were John Roberts and Samuel Alito, who were then Reagan Administration staffers, and who 
expressed similar views.  See Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. Fielding 2 (June 4, 1985), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/roberts/Box48-JGR-School
Prayer1.pdf (memorandum written by Chief Justice Roberts while serving in President Reagan’s Office 
of White House Counsel, approving of then-Justice Rehnquist’s attempt to “revolutionize” Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence by adopting the theory that the government may engage in the nonsectarian 
endorsement of religion); Samuel Alito, Non-Career Appointment Form 3 (Nov. 15, 1985), available at 
http://www.law.com/pdf/dc/alitoDOJ.pdf (application for a job as deputy assistant attorney general for 
the Reagan Administration, in which Justice Alito wrote that in college he “developed a deep interest in 
constitutional law, motivated in large part by disagreement with Warren Court decisions, particularly in 
the areas of criminal procedure, the Establishment Clause, and reapportionment”). 
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to treat any moral truth as a human construction that is always subject to re-
evaluation in light of experience.11 
In these new controversies, conservative Christians and Jews fre-
quently joined together against progressives of both faiths.  It became rea-
sonable to hope that the Republicans could capture the Jewish vote for the 
first time since the 1920s.12  (Compare the bitterly controversial Presidential 
candidacy of Catholic John F. Kennedy in 1960 with the non-issue of Jew-
ish, but clearly orthodox in Hunter’s sense, Vice-Presidential candidate Jo-
seph Lieberman in 2000.)  The traditionalists became an important 
constituency of the Republican party.13  While they differed over many 
things, they could agree on the importance of authority, notably symbolized 
by the invocation of God.  What could be more congenial to this coalition 
than a constitutional rule that equated the views of the traditionalists with 
national identity, while holding that those most distant from the traditio-
anlists’ revered authority were not full members of the political commu-
nity? 
B. Rehnquist 
The rule proposed by Meese had been declared a month earlier in a 
dissenting opinion by then-Justice William Rehnquist, relying on very re-
cent scholarly claims by Robert Cord: 
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of 
any church as a “national” one.  The Clause was also designed to stop the Fed-
eral Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or 
sect over others.  Given the “incorporation” of the Establishment Clause as 
against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are pro-
hibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects.  
As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause 
requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor 
does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secu-





  See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991). 
12
  See Herbert L. Solomon, The Republican Party and the Jews, 37 JUDAISM 276 (1988) (predicting 
a shift in Jewish support away from Democratic and toward Republican candidates in the 1988 election). 
13
  See GEOFFREY LAYMAN, THE GREAT DIVIDE: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL CONFLICT IN 
AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS 307–26 (2001); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN 
RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II 218–22 (1988).  The effect has become more 
pronounced over time.  In the 2004 presidential election, those attending church more than once a week 
voted for Bush by a margin of 65 percent to 35 percent, while those who never attend church were al-
most the inverse: 36 percent to 62 percent.  69 percent of Orthodox Jews voted for Bush, while only 23 
percent of Conservative Jews and 15 percent of Reform Jews voted for him.  Bush won 40 percent of the 
votes of Jews attending synagogue on a weekly basis, compared to 18 percent of those who rarely or 
never attend.  Jay Lefkowitz, The Election and the Jewish Vote, COMMENT., Feb. 2005, at 61, 64.  
14
  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Rehnquist cites ROBERT 
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982).  Id. at 104.  If Supreme Court Justices are going to 
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On this basis, Justice Rehnquist would have permitted a “generalized 
‘endorsement’ of prayer.”15 Justice Thomas followed this line for a time, 
finding “much to commend” in “the view that the Framers saw the Estab-
lishment Clause simply as a prohibition on governmental preferences for 
some religious faiths over others.”16  
Subsequent historical scholarship showed, however, that the nonpref-
erentialist interpretation of the First Amendment was mistaken.  The First 
Congress considered and rejected at least four drafts of the amendment that 
explicitly would have adopted the nonpreferentialist view.  Nor does the 
admittedly sparse legislative history offer much support for the position.  
No state offered nonpreferential aid to churches.  Such aid was only seri-
ously proposed in Maryland and Virginia, where it was rejected after much 
public debate in 1785 and 1786.  Aid to more than one church was offered 
in some New England states, but those systems were in practice preferential 
and produced bitter division.  There were also a variety of practices that en-
dorsed and supported a generalized Protestantism, but these were uncontro-
versial in a uniformly Protestant country, and no one appears to have given 
much thought to their constitutional status.  And, of course, state preference 
for Protestantism is not nonpreferentialism.17   
In 1992, Michael McConnell observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
“has not mentioned” his nonpreferentialism theory since he wrote his opin-
ion in Wallace in 1985, and that he “may have abandoned it.”18  Rehnquist 
never retracted his view, but to his credit, he became quiet about it when it 
became clear that it was wrong.  On the other hand, he did not change his 
position, but joined opinions by Scalia that proposed the same interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause on a different basis. 
                                                                                                             
propose to revolutionize the law on the basis of scholarship purporting to reveal the Constitution’s origi-
nal meaning, it would be prudent for them to wait a while to see how the scholarship is received.  Cord’s 
book was subjected to devastating critique within a few years of its publication.  See infra note 17. 
15
  Id. at 114. 
16
  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
17
  See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE 
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1994); Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Re-
ligion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986).  There was cause for 
doubt even before Rehnquist wrote his opinion.  See Mark V. Tushnet, Book Review, 45 LA. L. REV. 
175, 175 (1984) (concluding that Cord’s book “is a work of crank constitutional law”). 
18
  Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 145 (1992).  
There is disagreement about how strong the argument was when Rehnquist made it.  McConnell claims that 
Rehnquist relied on “seemingly powerful evidence of the original understanding,” which was refuted by 
“more complete historical research.”  Id at 146.  Laycock, on the other hand, writes that “[t]he prominence 
and longevity of the nonpreferential aid theory is remarkable in light of the weak evidence supporting it and 
the quite strong evidence against it.”  Laycock, supra note 17, at 877. 
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C. Scalia 
The nonpreferentialist theme was picked up intact by Justice Scalia in 
1987 in Edwards v. Aguillard, a case involving the teaching of “creation 
science” in the public schools.19  He proposed that the Court abandon the 
requirement that a law have a secular purpose.  Scalia is the Court’s most 
strident originalist,20 but in Edwards, unlike Rehnquist in Wallace, he of-
fered no evidence of original intent at all.  Instead, he proposed to modify 
the rule, like a good common law judge, because it was allegedly unwork-
able.21 
Five years later, however, in Lee v. Weisman, he became an originalist 
again.  He proposed to uphold a prayer at a public school graduation en-
tirely on the basis of history: 
Justice Holmes’ aphorism that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic” 
applies with particular force to our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  As we 
have recognized, our interpretation of the Establishment Clause should “com-
por[t] with what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its 
guarantees.”  “[T]he line we must draw between the permissible and the im-
permissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the under-
standing of the Founding Fathers.”  “[H]istorical evidence sheds light not only 
on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on 
how they thought that Clause applied” to contemporaneous practices.  Thus, 
“[t]he existence from the beginning of the Nation’s life of a practice, [while] 
not conclusive of its constitutionality . . . [,] is a fact of considerable import in 
the interpretation” of the Establishment Clause. 
 The history and tradition of our Nation are replete with public ceremonies 
featuring prayers of thanksgiving and petition.22 
The “originalism” here is of a very limited kind.  No theory of the Es-
tablishment Clause follows from Scalia’s premise.  History is a purely 
negative source.  As Kyle Duncan has written, “[t]raditions reflected in 
longstanding and persisting government practice generally tell Scalia what a 
constitutional provision was not originally designed to do.”23  But then, 
what does Scalia think the Establishment Clause means?  Scalia offered the 





  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
20
  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
21
  For a critique of the unworkability claim, see Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 87 (2002).  
22
  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632–33 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  For a 
similar catalogue of American ceremonial recognitions of religion, see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 
U.S. 844, 885–89 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23
  Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia’s Decalogue Dissent Down from the Mountain, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 287, 304. 
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[O]ur constitutional tradition . . . rule[s] out of order government-sponsored 
endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of 
specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, 
omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, 
the divinity of Christ).24 
This formulation offers many puzzles.  First, Scalia does not cite a sin-
gle historical source endorsing it.  He shows that historical practice is con-
sistent with it, but that is hardly the same thing as showing that anyone 
thought that it was a constitutional requirement.25  In fact, the common 
ground at the time of the Framing was not theism, but Protestantism.26  Sec-
ond, it is not clear how this rule follows from any of the purposes of the Es-
tablishment Clause.  Scalia says nothing about those purposes.  One reads 
his opinions in vain for any account of what the point was of having an Es-
tablishment Clause in the first place. 
More recently, in McCreary County v. ACLU,27 dissenting from a deci-
sion barring one ceremonial display of the Ten Commandments, Scalia 
frankly acknowledged that ceremonial theism would entail “contradicting 
the beliefs of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the gods 
pay no attention to human affairs.”28  The Commandments “are assuredly a 
religious symbol, but they are not so closely associated with a single reli-
gious belief that their display can reasonably be understood as preferring 
one religious sect over another.  The Ten Commandments are recognized by 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike as divinely given.”29  Justice Stevens 
objected that “[t]here are many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, as-
cribed to by different religions and even different denominations within a 





  Lee, 505 U.S. at 641.  It is unclear how this position can be reconciled with his vote in favor of 
opening football games with a Christian prayer in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.), and in favor of a state-
sponsored Christian crèche in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White & Scalia, JJ.).  
25
  See Thomas Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?  Justice Scalia, the Ten Command-
ments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1126–38 (2006). 
26
  See CURRY, supra note 17, at 123–24 (“They did not oppose a particular religion to religion in 
general in the sense of Protestantism, Catholicism, Judaism, or any other faith.  Rather, they opposed a 
particular Protestant denomination to Protestantism in general, which latter they did not equate with an 
establishment. . . .  [T]he notion of prayer and worship based on the Bible that was accepted by all Prot-
estants did not amount to a general establishment, but constituted an essential foundation of civilization.  
Such others as Catholics or Jews did not impinge sufficiently on their lives to challenge that assump-
tion.”). 
27
  545 U.S. 844. 
28
  Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).   
29
  Id. at 909.  There is a delicious ambiguity, which I will not pursue further here, about what it 
means to be “associated with a single religious belief.”  If the Ten Commandments are not so associated, 
then neither is the divinity of Christ, since Protestants and Catholics who violently disagree on many 
religious issues are nonetheless in agreement about that. 
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enormous religious significance.”30  Scalia—here joined by Rehnquist, 
Thomas, and Kennedy—retorted: “The sectarian dispute regarding text, if 
serious, is not widely known.  I doubt that most religious adherents are even 
aware that there are competing versions with doctrinal consequences (I cer-
tainly was not).”31  Justice Scalia thus envisions a role for the Court in 
which it decides which articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be 
eligible for state endorsement (and in which determinedly uneducable judi-
cial ignorance is a source of law!).  Evidently, the state may endorse any re-
ligious proposition so long as that proposition is—or is believed by a judge 
unacquainted with doctrinal niceties to be—a matter of agreement between 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  It would, for instance, be permissible for 
the state to declare that Gabriel is one of the most important archangels.  
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause would then depend on the 
further development of the Moslem idea of the People of the Book—those 
who have received a revelation that is deemed, formerly by the Koran, now 
by the Supreme Court—to be reliably from God.  The originalist credentials 
of that particular idea are pretty bad.  The United States at the time of the 
Framing was quite hostile to Moslem theology.32 
If there was a theological consensus at the time of the Framing, it 
looked nothing like the generalized monotheism that Scalia embraces.  At 
that time, “[a]ll but two [states] had religious tests for office, disqualifying 
Jews, Unitarians, and agnostics.  Some states even refused to enfranchise 
them, so they could not vote.”33  In most of the United States, only Protes-
tants could hold office, and Delaware restricted office to Trinitarians.34 
Scalia’s vision of state incompetence is limited only to certain theo-
logical propositions.  The state must not adjudicate the divinity of Christ.  
But it is only disagreement among monotheists that the state must keep its 
hands off.  It can authoritatively and reliably pronounce its views on the 





  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717–18 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Steven Lubet, 
The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 474–476 (1998)). 
31
  McCreary, 545 U.S. at 909 n.12 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
32
  Before 1800, there was “a well-established tradition” of “citing the similarities between an oppo-
nent’s views and the ‘beliefs’ of Islam as a means to discredit one’s adversaries.”  Thomas S. Kidd, “Is 
It Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?”  Early American Uses of Islam, 72 CHURCH HIST. 766, 
766 (2003); see also ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
MUSLIM WORLD, 1776–1815, at 35–59 (1995) (detailing the use of a negative portrayal of Islam and the 
Muslim world by politicians and thinkers at the time of the Framing); Denise A. Spellberg, Could a 
Muslim Be President?  An Eighteenth-Century Constitutional Debate, 39 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 
485 (2006) (contrasting the rhetorical use of Muslims by Federalists and Anti-Federalists). 
33
  LEVY, supra note 17, at 77. 
34
  Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A 
Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681–83 (1987). 
35
  For a similar criticism of the nonpreferentialist position, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that, because many religious Americans are not theists, a non-
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Scalia’s solution departs from Rehnquist’s earlier nonpreferentialism, 
because it unapologetically discriminates among religions.  Rehnquist 
thought that the Establishment Clause forbids “asserting a preference for 
one religious denomination or sect over others.”36  Justice Scalia once 
agreed: “I do not think that the Establishment Clause prohibits formally es-
tablished ‘state’ churches and nothing more.  I have always believed, and all 
my opinions are consistent with the view, that the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the favoring of one religion over others.”37  Not all religions in-
volve a belief in “a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the 
world.”38  Scalia’s formulation does discriminate among religions.  Chris-
tians, Jews, and Moslems are in; Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists are out.  
The outs are a lot of people. 
Thomas Colby has argued that Scalia has adopted the astounding posi-
tion that the Establishment Clause itself discriminates among religions: 
state endorsement of polytheism or atheism would violate the clause, but 
state endorsement of biblical monotheism does not.39  Kyle Duncan has re-
sponded that Scalia is using generalized monotheism as a baseline for what 
is constitutionally permitted but is not committed to invalidating other en-
dorsements of religious belief that are not monotheistic.  Scalia’s tradition-
alism, Duncan observes, is “a ‘one-way ratchet’—that is, a method that 
tends to use tradition negatively (to say what practices ambiguous constitu-
tional guarantees do not restrain) and not positively (to say what practices 
ambiguous constitutional guarantees forbid).”40 
This “one-way ratchet” approach relies on no theory of the meaning or 
purpose of the Establishment Clause.  Scalia’s claim is that whatever the 
Establishment Clause means, it cannot apply to a practice of which the 
Framers knew and approved.  The argument is essentially, “I have no idea 
                                                                                                             
preferentialist “would still need to explain why the government’s preference for theistic religion is con-
stitutional”).  
36
  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
37
  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748 (1994) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).  Again, it is not clear what “one religion” means here. 
38
  Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The Court held long ago that the Establish-
ment Clause forbids government to “aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as 
against those religions founded on different beliefs.”  Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).  
The Court noted that “[a]mong religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be 
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism 
and others.”  Id. at 495 n.11.  To say that Buddhism rejects theism is something of an overstatement.  
While the historical Buddha had no interest in theological questions, some forms of Buddhism make 
theological claims, sometimes assigning divine status to Buddha himself.  For a general overview of 
these issues, see Masao Abe, Buddhism, in OUR RELIGIONS 69–137 (Arvind Sharma ed., 1993).  Hindu-
ism is only the most prominent of many polytheistic religions.  There are, concededly, monotheistic in-
terpretations of Hinduism, but not all Hindus subscribe to these interpretations. 
39
  Colby, supra note 25, at 1102. 
40
  Duncan, supra note 23, at 327 (quoting A.C. Pritchard & Todd Zywicki, Finding the Constitu-
tion: An Economic Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 
424–25 (1999)). 
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what this provision means.  But whatever it means, it can’t prohibit this, be-
cause the Framers approved of it.”  This is a distinctive kind of originalism, 
and it ought to have a name.41  Call it “I Have No Idea Originalism.” 
Colby’s reading attributes to Scalia a claim of principle.  Duncan’s im-
plicit premise is that this is mistaken.  If Duncan is right, then Colby’s mis-
take is understandable.  Judges interpreting legal provisions are generally 
understood to be making claims about what those provisions mean.  Ac-
cording to Duncan, however, Scalia was doing nothing of the sort.  Scalia 
has made no claims about the meaning of the Establishment Clause because 
he hasn’t the foggiest notion what it means.42  Duncan’s interpretation of 
Scalia implies that Colby has misinterpreted Scalia out of an excess of char-
ity.43 
There are several difficulties with “I Have No Idea Originalism.”  One 
is that it produces results that modern interpreters are likely to be uncom-
fortable with.  A structurally identical argument was made on behalf of laws 
mandating segregated schools, or prohibiting interracial marriage: the 
Framers knew and approved of such laws, therefore the Fourteenth 
Amendment, whatever it means, cannot prohibit that.44  The same argument 
might be made to show that the Free Speech Clause permits a law criminal-
izing criticism of incumbent officeholders.  Congress enacted just such a 
law, less than a decade after the First Amendment was adopted, in the Sedi-





  It does not appear in the otherwise very useful taxonomy of originalisms in Colby and Smith.  See 
Colby & Smith, supra note 2, pt. I.   On the other hand, the basic methodological move, and its funda-
mental lack of principle, are noted in Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the 
False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 573–74 (2008). 
42
  Neither does Duncan: 
At most, Scalia would be saying that religious acknowledgments that diverge from historical stan-
dards (for instance, a Christian symbol, or Islamic language, or a Buddhist text) would not be the 
easy Establishment Clause cases that a generic monotheism presents.  What “test” Scalia might 
devise to assess these harder cases he does not say, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to de-
vise one. 
Duncan, supra note 23, at 342. 
43
  On the other hand, it is not clear that Duncan’s interpretation of the evidence fits the data better 
than Colby’s.  “There are a few passages in Scalia’s dissent that, if read out of context and divorced 
from Scalia’s interpretative methodology and overall jurisprudence, might support” Colby’s reading, 
Duncan admits.  Id. at 324.  In other words, there are passages in Scalia that do appear to be articulating 
a rule, albeit one that the Framers never articulated and that Duncan implicitly concedes is indefensible. 
44
  See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 117–33, 161–63 (1977); Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966).  Duncan claims that Fourteenth Amendment cases 
are distinctive, observing that “Scalia sees the Equal Protection Clause as having ‘counter-historical’ con-
tent—that is, as designed to invalidate certain historical practices that might otherwise claim the status 
of tradition.”  Duncan, supra note 23, at 315 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  The Establishment Clause, however, is no less counter-historical than 
the Equal Protection Clause.  Both provisions are reactions against certain specific historical practices.   
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President “with intent to defame” or “to excite against them . . . the hatred 
of the good people of the United States.”45 
The deeper problem is that “I Have No Idea Originalism” does not 
even try to interpret the Constitution.  It does not attempt to state the princi-
ple for which the disputed constitutional provision stands.  Scalia might ar-
gue that original practice cannot determine the meaning of these clauses, 
but it can eliminate some proposed interpretations, those inconsistent with 
the original practices.  As we have just seen, however, the procedure for 
eliminating even those interpretations is question-begging.  The fact that 
someone in the Founding generation did something does not prove that it 
was constitutionally permissible even then.  You have to say what the 
clause means before you can tell whether it has been violated.46 
The defenders of the miscegenation laws did better than Scalia in this 
respect.  In the 1883 case of Pace v. Alabama,47 the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of miscegenation laws.  The statute in question in Pace 
prescribed penalties for interracial sex that were more severe than those im-
posed for adultery or fornication between persons of the same race.  The 
Court unanimously rejected the equal protection challenge to the statute, de-
nying that the statute discriminated on the basis of race: 
[The section prohibiting interracial sex] prescribes a punishment for an offence 
which can only be committed where the two sexes are of different races.  
There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. . . .  What-
ever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections is 
directed against the offence designated and not against the person of any par-
ticular color or race.  The punishment of each offending person, whether white 
or black, is the same.48 
The Pace Court did not embrace “I Have No Idea Originalism.”  It had a 
principle upon which it relied: the Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws that 
treat the races differently.  Miscegenation laws, the Court held, do not violate 
that principle.49 
The trouble with the Pace Court’s reasoning, of course, is that it is en-





  The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).   
46
  For a similar argument by a careful originalist, see Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Con-
stitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362–63 (1988). 
47
  106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
48
  Id. at 585. 
49
  It may sound to you like a silly argument, but for a long time courts have rejected claims that dis-
crimination against gay people is sex discrimination on the basis of the identical logic: men who have 
sex with men and women who have sex with women are treated the same, therefore there is no sex dis-
crimination.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 438 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting sex discrimination 
argument, but upholding claim for same-sex marriage on other grounds).  For a critique, see Andrew 
Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Ed-
ward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). 
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The later Plessy v. Ferguson decision, upholding racial segregation statutes 
(relying in part on the authority of Pace), at least concedes that it would cut 
against a law’s constitutionality if it were true that the law “stamps the col-
ored race with a badge of inferiority.”50  Pace says nothing at all about why 
there is an Equal Protection Clause, though it implies that the concern is not 
with the subordination of groups, but with a certain kind of classification.  (In 
this it resembles the present Court.)51  It is, then, unsurprising that it was ulti-
mately overruled when the Court noticed that miscegenation laws were 
“measures designed to maintain White Supremacy,”52 and that this purpose 
“violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”53 
Jack Balkin observes that when the text of the Constitution proposes a 
vague principle, like equal protection or nonestablishment, that principle 
must be cashed out in terms of subsidiary or underlying principles.  History 
can help determine what these principles are.  Contemporaneous statements 
of principle, and the general problems that the provision sought to address, 
are both pertinent.  “The principles underlying the text should be at roughly 
the same level of generality as the text (understood to include any generally 
recognized terms of art).  If the text uses general language, the underlying 
principles that support and explain the text should as well.”54  This is be-
cause the Framers should be presumed to know what they are doing if they 
use very abstract language.  “Absent strong evidence to the contrary, we as-
sume that people choose general language if they want to endorse general 
principles, and more specific language if they want to commit themselves to 
narrower principles.”55 
So with the Establishment Clause, our task is to discern the principle 
for which the provision stands.  The proper originalist formulation is that of 
a Supreme Court Justice who never proclaimed himself an originalist, Wil-
liam Brennan, who wrote in 1963 that the Court should ask whether chal-
lenged practices “threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply 
feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence 





  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).  “If this be so,” the Court concluded, “it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it.”  Id.  Charles Black observes that “the Plessy Court clearly conceived it to be its task to show 
that segregation did not really disadvantage the Negro, except through his own choice.”  Charles L. 
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1960). 
51
  See supra note 5.  
52
  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
53
  Id. at 12. 
54
  Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 
493 (2007). 
55
  Id.  The same point was made long ago by Dworkin.  See supra note 1.  
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prevent.”56  The question is what are “those substantive evils the fear of 
which called for the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment”?57 
The interpretive rules proposed by Balkin have no particular political 
valence.58  One might use them as a basis for a narrow or a broad under-
standing of establishment.  Even a very narrow understanding of establish-
ment is different from I Have No Idea Originalism.  What is remarkable 
about Scalia’s argument in Lee and McCreary is that he offers no principle 
at all. 
D. Thomas 
Justice Thomas, who also insists on originalism as a formula for con-
straining judicial discretion,59 has flirted with the nonpreferentialist posi-
tion.60  More recently, however, he has suggested that the Establishment 





  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
57
  Id. at 241. 
58
  Some originalists have challenged another of Balkin’s claims—that constitutional principles 
should not depend on the original expected application of a constitutional provision.  John McGinnis and 
Michael Rappaport have challenged this claim, arguing that interpretation ought to look to original ex-
pected application because doing so yields important information about the meaning of the words.  John 
O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007).  It is not clear whether McGinnis and Rappaport would follow original 
expected applications in all cases, such as miscegenation and school segregation; they do not discuss 
these issues.  What is clear is that they think that original expected application should guide a choice 
among general principles.  That is already a constraint on original expected application, since some 
original expected applications might not be justifiable under any principle reasonably attributable to the 
text.  The use of original expected application that they defend is quite different than that of Justice 
Scalia. 
On the other hand, Professor McGinnis has criticized an interpretive argument of mine entirely on 
the basis of original expected application, arguing that abortion could not possibly raise a Thirteenth 
Amendment issue because the Framers would not have thought it did.  John O. McGinnis, Decentraliz-
ing Constitutional Provisions Versus Judicial Oligarchy: A Reply to Professor Koppelman, 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 39, 56 (2003).   
59
  See Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). 
60
  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (noting the scholarship refuting Cord, but stating with almost no explanation that he takes 
Cord’s side of this debate). 
61
  The suggestion had appeared in earlier opinions, but had not been pressed very hard.  See Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that on its face the 
Establishment Clause places no limit on states, and arguing that, unlike the Federal Government, states 
“may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exer-
cise rights or any other individual liberty rights”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., and others) (“The Establishment Clause was adopted to prohibit such 
an establishment of religion at the federal level (and to protect state establishments of religion from fed-
eral interference).”).  Thomas endorsed it again in his most recent Establishment Clause opinion, Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he [Establishment] Clause’s 
text and history “resis[t] incorporation” against the States.” (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
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tion that, because the clause is not an individual rights provision, it is not 
incorporable into the Fourteenth Amendment.62  However, he ignores 
Amar’s claim that religious classifications may violate equal protection: 
As strange as it sounds, an incorporated Establishment Clause prohibits ex-
actly what the Establishment Clause protected—state practices that pertain to 
“an establishment of religion.”  At the very least, the burden of persuasion 
rests with anyone who claims that the term took on a different meaning upon 
incorporation.63 
He suggests that the Court’s 1962 and 1963 cases invalidating class-
room prayer and Bible reading were wrongly decided.64  He invites litigants 
to bring about a revolution in Establishment Clause law: “I would welcome 
the opportunity to consider more fully the difficult questions whether and 
how the Establishment Clause applies against the States.”65 
Thomas is following a respectable line of scholarship.  This scholar-
ship argues that the Establishment Clause did not enact any principle of re-
ligious freedom at all, but merely enacted a jurisdictional boundary between 
the states and the federal government, whereby the federal government had 
no power either to establish a religion or to eliminate state establishments.  
This claim has been extensively debated,66 and it is a possible reading of the 
textual language, although no Framer ever expressly endorsed it.67 
Even if one accepts the claim, however, it does not mean that the Court 
was mistaken in finding that a nonestablishment principle is binding on the 
states in Everson and its progeny.  The pertinent intention is not that of the 
Framers of the First Amendment, but the Framers of the Fourteenth, which 
is the source of any constraint that is now imposed on the states.  This is the 
familiar problem of incorporation of the Bill of Rights.68   
Kurt Lash has shown that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
certainly intended to apply the establishment norm to the states.  Freedom 
from established religion was understood to be an aspect of individual free-





  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 n.4 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment), citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 253–
54 (1998).  For a critique of Amar, see Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 
33 U. RICH. L. REV. 393 (1999).  
63
  Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 51 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).   
64
  Id. at 53 (quoting Justice Stewart’s dissent in the prayer case, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 
(1962)). 
65
  Id. at 51. 
66
  For a brief summary of the literature, see Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Establishment 
Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843, 1844 (2006). 
67
  Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 761 (2005); see also Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Reli-
gious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 240–43 (2004) 
(noting other flaws in Thomas’s originalist argument). 
68
  The literature is reviewed in AMAR, supra note 62, at 137–140. 
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stood to be a liberty as fully capable of incorporation as any other provision 
in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.”69 
Perhaps Thomas has an answer to the difficulty raised by Lash’s schol-
arship.  It is impossible to tell.  Thomas ignores Lash and pretends that his 
work does not exist.  Instead, he selectively cites the findings of originalist 
scholarship that support the result he is inclined to reach—sweeping con-
trary evidence under the rug—while claiming that he is merely following 





  Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablish-
ment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1154 (1995).  For a similar view on the incorporation question, 
see 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 14–15, 
26–39 (2008).  Steven D. Smith, one of the most prominent exponents of the jurisdictional interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause, asks some good questions about Lash.  Lash shows that the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment thought, mistakenly, that the Establishment Clause had more substantive con-
tent than the Framers intended.  “Did the enactors intend to incorporate their own (mistaken) under-
standing of the religion clauses?”  STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 51 (1995).  It seems equally possible that the en-
actors “intended to incorporate the original meaning of the religion clauses, whatever that original 
meaning was.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  It is impossible to tell which of these the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment themselves would have preferred.  And even if the Amendment includes a non-
establishment norm, its meaning is very different from, and rests on different historical sources than, 
what has generally been supposed.  “Madison and Jefferson, Isaac Backus and John Leland, would be 
displaced as definers of constitutional religious freedom by John Bingham, Thaddeus Stevens, Charles 
Sumner, and their contemporaries.”  Id. at 53.  Given the dominance of the “Christian Nation” idea in 
the mid-nineteenth century, Smith argues, the understanding of the religion clauses that follows from 
Lash’s thesis is likely to be very different from present doctrine, or from what Madison imagined. 
Smith overlooks a third possibility: that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood them-
selves to be embodying just the kind of ideal of nonestablishment that had animated Madison, and that 
they were trying to constrain the states, and thus to avoid the evils of alienation and corruption, in just 
the same way that the original Establishment Clause constrained the federal government.  If this is cor-
rect—here it can only be a suggestion—then the Court has been right to rely on the thought of Madison, 
who gave religion far more sustained attention than the Framers of 1868, to work out the meaning of 
nonestablishment. 
More recently, Smith has been more generous to the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment could be a 
basis for a broad conception of Establishment Clause constraints on the states.  Smith, supra note 66. 
70
  In fairness to Justice Thomas, a Westlaw “citing references” search of sources citing Lash’s arti-
cle finds that it has only been mentioned in two Supreme Court briefs, and neither addressed the core 
question of whether the Establishment Clause is jurisdictional.  One tried to show that state establish-
ments were no longer protected from federal scrutiny.  Brief of National Association of Evangelicals and 
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 24–
26, Cutter v. Wilkinson (No. 03-9877), 2004 WL 2967824.  The other, by selective quotation, misrepre-
sented Lash’s principal thesis.  Brief on the Merits of Amicus Curiae Pacific Justice Institute at 16, 
McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky (No. 03-1693), 2004 WL 2851010. 
On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect Thomas, before proposing a constitutional revolution, to 
do his basic homework and to familiarize himself with the historical scholarship.  He might have begun 
by more carefully reading Amar’s book, on which he placed such reliance, since Amar includes a dis-
cussion of Lash’s precise findings, although not in the passages Thomas cites.  AMAR, supra note 62, at 
254–56.  The Supreme Court has excellent librarians.  Had Justice Thomas asked one of them to find the 
evidence, he would have gotten Lash’s article immediately. 
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Thomas has also attributed to the Framers a different view: that a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause requires legal coercion.71  His method is 
essentially the same as Scalia’s: he shows that the Framers’ behavior was 
consistent with such a rule.  He offers no evidence that any Framer en-
dorsed, or even thought of, that rule.  He calls the rule he has invented “the 
original meaning of the Clause.”72 
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AS A PARADIGM CASE 
What would a sound originalist approach to the Establishment Clause 
look like? 
The role of original meaning is contested in constitutional law.  But it 
is generally agreed that, when a provision is aimed at a specific historical 
evil, the provision should be read as preventing a recurrence of that evil or 
others relevantly like it.  Of course, there is room for disagreement as to 
what counts as other evils relevantly like it.  When a situation not abso-
lutely identical to that original evil arises, we must decide whether it is 
relevantly like it.  In such a situation, the original meaning won’t help us.  
The prohibition rarely arrives with a rule for its interpretation, and often the 
Framers had no specific interpretive rule in mind.73  When the authors of the 
First Amendment condemned establishment, Thomas Curry noted, “they 
had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a definition of a system.”74 
A. The Paradigm Case Method 
Jed Rubenfeld has observed that constitutional interpretation is fre-
quently guided by paradigm cases, which are specific core commitments 
that are memorialized by the constitutional provisions.  An example is the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The amendment’s language is broad, but it was 
enacted specifically in order to outlaw the Black Codes—laws enacted by 
white-controlled legislatures after the Civil War that imposed specific legal 
disabilities on blacks, such as requiring them to be gainfully employed un-
der contracts of long duration, excluding them from occupations other than 





  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693–94 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).  The originalist evi-
dence here likewise has been shown to be weak.  See Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Re-
ligion: Another False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1991).     
72
  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693. 
73
  Thus, for example, Leonard Levy has shown that, at the time of the Framing of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment, neither James Madison nor anyone else had figured out that the protec-
tion of free speech must prevent the state from punishing seditious libel, even though this core meaning 
of the Clause would shortly be argued by Madison in his critique of the Sedition Act a few years later.  
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 321–25 (1985).   
74
  CURRY, supra note 17, at 211.  The Court has similarly observed that the purpose of the Framers 
of the First Amendment “was to state an objective, not to write a statute.”  Walz v. Tax Comm’n of the 
City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
75
  See THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965). 
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Any plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment must invalidate 
the Black Codes.  More broadly, any interpretation that specifies the more 
general types of inequality that the amendment forbids must be a chain of 
inferences from the core commitment represented by the paradigm case.76 
It is hard to imagine how an originalist could avoid using the paradigm 
case method in some form, at least in interpreting those constitutional pro-
visions that are aimed at specific evils.  For example, the Fourth Amend-
ment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures should be read in light of 
the controversies over general searches and writs of assistance before the 
American Revolution.77  The Contract Clause should be read as a response 
to debtor relief legislation in the 1780s.78  If original meaning is to count at 
all, then a constitutional provision must be understood to address the very 
problem that it was designed to remedy. 
Unless it states a specific rule, a constitutional provision must also be 
understood to stand for some principle.  That principle must address the 
very problem that the provision was designed to solve.  The principle, how-
ever, cannot simply be a rule that addresses that problem and nothing more.  
If the Framers had intended to address only a specific problem, they could 
have said so. 
B. The Right Establishment Clause Questions to Ask 
The Establishment Clause is a particularly apt candidate for paradigm 
case interpretation because the core historical wrong that it is intended to 
bar—an establishment of religion of the kind that existed in England—is 
specifically named in the text.79   
Paradigm case reasoning proceeds by “extrapolating general principles 
from the foundational paradigm cases and applying those principles to the 
controversy at hand.”80  With respect to provisions such as the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit certain government actions, the 
general principle should give a convincing account of the result in the para-
digm case while at the same time properly specifying the kind of evil that 
the prohibition reaches.  The principle should explain what kind of wrong 
the provision is prohibiting, so that in subsequent controversies it is possi-





  JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
178–195 (2001).  The idea that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in light of paradigm cases 
is, of course, hardly original with Rubenfeld.  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion 
Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 683, 690 (1990).  But Rubenfeld lays out the argu-
ment with unusual clarity and detail. 
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  See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32–33 (2005); Laycock, supra note 76, at 690. 
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  See Laycock, supra note 76, at 690. 
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  Rubenfeld briefly discusses the interpretation of the Establishment Clause in REVOLUTION BY 
JUDICIARY, supra note 77, at 29–30. 
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  RUBENFELD, supra note 76, at 191. 
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In Establishment Clause cases, then, a good originalist judge should 
ask: (1) why did the Framers think establishment of religion is a bad thing; 
and (2) is the same bad thing brought about by the challenged action in this 
case?  There will obviously be room for disagreement about both of these 
issues.  The paradigm case method does not decide cases, but it makes clear 
which questions the judges should ask. 
The problem is made more difficult by the need to discern the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.81  It is clear that the Framers meant to con-
strain state sponsorship of religion, but it is unclear how they intended to do 
this.  To make matters more difficult, the meaning of nearly every provision 
of the Bill of Rights that has been incorporated has been held to be exactly 
the same with respect to the federal government and the states, despite 
prominent arguments that they ought to be treated differently.82 
Discerning the original meaning of nonestablishment is obviously far 
beyond the scope of this Article.  It is enough here to show that it is a diffi-
cult task, and that the Court’s “originalist” judges aren’t even trying to do it.  
But something can be said about what is being ignored in their analysis. 
C. Madison 
The classic description of the pathologies that the Founding generation 
associated with establishment is James Madison’s Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments.83  Madison was reticent about his 
own religious beliefs, which were probably some variant of Deism,84 but the 
Memorial and Remonstrance is nonetheless the most useful source of anti-
establishment thinking.  It was a public document, not a private statement 
of Madison’s views.  It presented a synthesis of the anti-establishment 
views that prevailed in his time, combining religious arguments designed to 
appeal to Evangelical Christians and secular arguments designed to appeal 
to Enlightenment Lockeans.85  It is unlikely that these groups agreed on 





  Justice Thomas evades this difficult problem. 
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tices).  
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  James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in 
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 10–11 (Marvin 
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). 
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  See DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 91–98 (2006). 
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WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 21–35 (2d ed. 2005); 
THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, S.J., CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776–1787 (1977).  
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The original meaning of nonestablishment cannot, of course, simply be 
read off the writings of Madison.  Nonetheless, the Memorial and Remon-
strance is the most important single datum on that meaning, and it shows us 
the concerns, prominent at the time of the Framing, that the so-called 
“originalists” ignore.87 
Madison objected to the establishment of religion, even the mild non-
preferentialist proposal that he was writing against, for many reasons, of 
which I will here cite only two.  The first is a kind of political alienation.  
Establishment “degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose 
opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”88  
The second is the corruption of religion itself.  Madison argued that the idea 
“that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth” is “an 
arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all 
ages.”89  Madison denounced the idea that religion should be promoted be-
cause it is conducive to good citizenship, an idea that we often hear today.  
                                                                                                             
 The state debates help show how the concept of establishment was understood in the Framers’ 
generation. Learning how that generation understood the concept may be more informative than 
the brief and unfocused debate in the House [on the First Amendment.  The Senate debate was not 
recorded].  If the Framers generally understood the concept in a certain way, and if nothing indi-
cates that they used the word in an unusual sense in the first amendment, then we can fairly as-
sume that the Framers used the word in accordance with their general understanding of the 
concept.  
*  * * 
 For several reasons, the debates in Virginia were most important.  First, the arguments were 
developed most fully in Virginia.  Second, Madison led the winning coalition, and he played a 
dominant role in the adoption of the establishment clause three years later.  Third, the debates in 
Virginia may have been the best known.  
Laycock, supra note 17, at 895; accord SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF 
CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 57 (1963). 
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at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–2181 (2003).  
But McConnell does not suggest that the Establishment Clause is only violated where one or more of 
these elements are present.  In other writings, it is clear that his own interpretation of the clause is a (far 
less narrow) extrapolation from the paradigm case.  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 18; Michael W. 
McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Why is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1243 (2000).  McConnell’s 
six elements can be mapped directly on to all the modern controversies with even modest efforts to 
adapt to changed social conditions.  See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behav-
ior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1798–
1801 (2006).   A narrow reading of the paradigm case is of course possible, and one might conclude on 
this basis that school prayer, or even official denunciations of theological error, do not violate the clause.  
No one on the Court has taken this approach, however, so I will not address it further here.  Thanks to 
Steven D. Smith for pressing me on this issue. 
88
  Madison, supra note 83, at 10–11. 
89
  Id. at 9.  
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He felt that this idea was an attempt to “employ Religion as an engine of 
Civil policy,” which he thought “an unhallowed perversion of the means of 
salvation.”90  Moreover,  
experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining 
the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.  During al-
most fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial.  
What have been its fruits?  More or less in all places, pride and indolence in 
the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry 
and persecution.91 
D. Madison v. Scalia 
Although this is not the place to defend the Court’s interpretations of 
the Establishment Clause,92 a cursory reading makes clear that the two con-
cerns of political alienation and corruption of religion have animated much 
of the caselaw.  The Court has understood its task to be to devise practical 
rules that would prevent these two evils.  You may, of course, disagree with 
the Court.  But the way to do that is to show that alienation and corruption 
are not, in fact, the consequences of the state activities that the Court has 
been inclined to invalidate under the Establishment Clause.93 
These considerations are particularly pertinent to Justice Scalia’s inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause.  The idea that religion might be de-
graded by state sponsorship is entirely lost on Scalia.  The closest he comes 
to acknowledging the Madisonian concerns about alienation and corruption 
is one passage in which he deems it relevant that the major monotheistic re-
ligions—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—“combined account for 97.7% 
of all believers.”94  But his numbers are wrong: in calculating the level of 
exclusion here, nonbelievers are doubly excluded, since they are not even 
entitled to be part of the denominator.  If one adds the nonbelievers, as 
enumerated in the 2004 Statistical Abstract of the United States which 
Scalia cites, the excluded adult population is 33 million out of 207 million, 
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The numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than the Statistical Ab-
stract suggests.  The proportion of Americans who report having no reli-
gious preference doubled in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had 
been its level for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998.  However, most of 
the members of this category are in fact religious.  More than half believe in 
God, more than half believe in life after death, about a third believe in 
heaven and hell, and 93 percent sometimes pray.  The most careful study of 
this group concludes that the newer members are mostly “unchurched be-
lievers” who declare no religious preference in an effort to express their dis-
tance from the religious right.96 
It is clear that these people are not interested in being part of the theis-
tic triumphalism that Scalia wants to license.  Similarly, Steven Gey ob-
serves that, in order to calculate the number of people excluded from 
Scalia’s formula, one ought also to include the large number of theists who 
reject state sponsorship of religion, including “[t]raditional Roger Williams-
style Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, most Jews, 
many Presbyterians, and other modern nonfundamentalist Protestants.”97  
Scalia does not explain his indifference to these people while he conspicu-
ously includes Jews (whether they want inclusion or not) and Moslems, 
who together comprise fewer than 4 million Americans.98 
III. DUPES AND FELLOW TRAVELERS 
In short, the “originalism” that one now finds on the Supreme Court is 
a phony originalism which is opportunistically used to advance substantive 
positions that the judges find congenial.  There are originalists who deserve 
to be taken seriously, but none of them are Supreme Court Justices.99 
The conclusions of this Article do not in any way impugn the work of 
originalist scholars who are conscientiously striving to determine the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution.  It is the scholars, not the judges, whose 
                                                                                                             
Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 284–85 (2007); Gey, supra note 92, 
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work comprises this Symposium.  The Justices’ disingenuousness however 
raises the question what originalist scholars are, objectively, doing. 
One thing that originalist scholarship will certainly do is stir the pot of 
constitutional interpretation, turning up new and potentially revolutionary 
meanings for old provisions.  Those new meanings may subsequently be re-
futed by subsequent scholarship, as has happened with Cord and with the 
jurisdictional reading of the (incorporated) Establishment Clause.  But the 
function of all this scholarship in the Supreme Court is somewhat different 
than its authors intend: “originalist” Justices opportunistically use the 
scholarship to attack areas of the law that they don’t like.  Since the conclu-
sions of historical scholarship shift over time and since the judges are not 
constrained by the fact that a conclusion reached by some scholar at some 
time has since been refuted, the consequence is to expand the field of judi-
cial discretion by presenting judges with a broad menu of possible interpre-
tations, each of which have sufficient originalist credentials to qualify for 
citation in the U.S. Reports. 
In his classic work of anticommunist propaganda, Masters of Deceit, 
then-FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover listed the various types of supporters 
upon whom the Communist Party relied for its nefarious ends. “The fellow 
traveler, while not a member, actively supports (travels with) the Party’s 
program for a period of time.”100  Fellow travelers are valuable to the party 
precisely because they are not affiliated with it.  “They are more valuable 
outside: as financial contributors, vocal mouthpieces, or contacts between 
Party officials and non-communists.  They constitute, in fact, fronts for, and 
defenders of, the Communist Party.”101  The party also depends on the 
“dupe,” the person who “unknowingly is under Communist thought control 
and does the work of the Party.”102 
Hoover did not want to be too hard on the dupes.  Most of them, he 
wrote, were “loyal, but deceived, citizens.”103  Most originalist scholars do 
not mean simply to be shills for the agenda of the Republican Party.104  
They should, however, understand the function they are performing.  They 
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